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THE AFTERMATH OF SAAL V. MIDDENDORF:
DOES HOMOSEXUALITY PRECLUDE MILITARY
FITNESS
I. INTRODUCTION
Department of Defense policy requires prompt separation
of homosexuals. The homosexual person is considered un-
suitable for military service and is not permitted to serve
in the Armed Forces in any capacity. His presence in a
military unit would seriously impair discipline, good or-
der, morale, and security. Further, the Department of De-
fense has an obligation and responsibility to provide our
young men and women in the Armed Forces with the
most wholesome and healthful environment possible.1
This Department of Defense directive, issued to all
branches of the armed forces, expressly excludes the homosex-
ual person from employment by the military, and if an en-
listed person has admitted to engaging in homosexual con-
duct, then that person is considered ineligible for
reenlistment. Although the military, and the Navy in particu-
lar, asserts that one's constitutional rights are not surrendered
upon entering the service, the rights are applied in light of the
unique military exigencies that necessarily govern many as-
pects of military service.2 Whether one's sexual orientation
should be governed by the "unique military exigencies" of the
Navy is questionable where the objectives of procedural and
substantive due process are concerned.
An illustration of the United States Navy's broad policy'
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1. Department of Defense Policy on Homosexuals in the Armed Forces, Appen-
dix "A": Memo in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, quoted in Brief for
Appellee, Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
2. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1980).
3. Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 1900.9A states:
Members involved in homosexuality are military liabilities who cannot
be tolerated in a military organization. In developing and documenting
cases involving homosexual conduct, commanding officers should be
keenly aware that members involved in homosexual acts are security
and reliability risks who discredit themselves and the Naval service by
their homosexual conduct. Their prompt separation is essential.
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excluding individuals from the service based upon sexual pref-
erence is reflected in the chain of events beginning on January
7, 1972 when Mary Roseann Saal enlisted in the Navy. While
in active service, Saal's performance was excellent, as shown
in portions of her service record introduced in testimony in
the district court." In April 1973, however, Saal admitted hav-
ing sexual relations with another female and the Navy com-
menced discharge proceedings against her in accordance with
the Secretary of the Navy Instruction (hereinafter
SECNAVINST) 1900.9A. This instruction mandated dis-
charge of any admitted homosexual regardless of the individ-
ual's fitness to serve in the military. 5 On August 22, 1975, she
was honorably discharged and her records coded "Re-4," indi-
cating her ineligibility for reenlistment. e
Such summary dismissals raise the question of the consti-
tutionality of proceedings in which due process is noticeably
absent and where a nexus between homosexual conduct and
unsuitability for service is lacking.7 The "nexus" argument re-
fers to the connection between one's sexual preference and
unfitness for service, which should be reasonably demon-
strated before the Navy is allowed to discharge personnel on
that basis.
In Saal v. Middendorf,s the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit focused on the constitutionality of
the Navy's dismissal of the three plaintiffs involved in the suit
and the policies under which the Navy acted. It rejected the
argument that homosexual activity does not "adversely im-
pact on the effective performance" of the naval mission.' Con-
versely, the court concluded that the importance of those gov-
ernment interests outweighed the appropriate solicitude for
4. In this connection, the official summary of the hearing before the ad-
ministrative board on July 6, 1973 is illuminating. It reflects the state-
ment by the board's senior member that 'he himself was familiar with
[plaintiff's] work and that her work was outstanding'; the argument of
the recorder (Navy counsel) 'that although [plaintiff] was an outstand-
ing worker, the main issue was whether she had engaged in homosexual
acts.' . ...
Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 197 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 194.
7. Doe v. Chafee, 355 F. Supp. 112; 114 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
8. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
9. Id. at 812.
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consensual private homosexual conduct. 10
In light of the significant problems with the Navy's auto-
matic dismissal of homosexual personnel, a new set of instruc-
tions was issued after the commencement of the Saal appeal.
These instructions provide for limited retention of
homosexuals.1
This comment will initially examine the court's approach
in balancing the individual's needs with regard to sexual pref-
erence against the special "exigencies" of military life. The
new Naval regulation will then be analyzed to determine if its
more expansive language will affect the rights of enlisted ho-
mosexual personnel in a beneficial or adverse manner. Finally,
alternative solutions will be proposed as equitable resolutions
of the homosexual "military liability""' issue.
II. LEGAL HISTORY OF Saal v. Middendorf
At Mary Roseann Saal's discharge proceedings in April
1973, naval counsel presented Saal's confession of homosexu-
ality and accompanying affidavit's to the hearing board and
argued that if the board found that Saal had committed ho-
mosexual acts then the board must recommend her dis-
charge.'4 Although a senior discharge board member person-
ally viewed Saal's work as outstanding," naval counsel noted
that the issue was whether Saal had engaged in homosexual
activity while in the Navy.' After closing arguments, the
board unanimously recommended Saal's general discharge
under conditions of unfitness, which Saal unsuccessfully ap-
pealed to the Chief of Naval Personnel. 7
Saal then filed a civil action in the United States District
10. Id.
11. Id. at 802 n.9.
12. Id. at 803.
13. Brief for Appellee, Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. The affidavit states in pertinent part:
My sexual activity with women has never affected my loyalty to the
Navy, my mental and physical fitness for the service, nor my honesty. I
believe that my discharge from the service was not only my loss, but I
feel very strongly that it was also the Navy's loss.
Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 4.
15. 427 F. Supp. at 197 n.3.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 194. The Chief of Naval Personnel later ordered plaintiff's separation
with an honorable discharge.
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Court for the Northern District of California, seeking consti-
tutional review of the invasions of her right of privacy, her
privilege against self-incrimination, the discharge board's fail-
ure to determine whether Saal's homosexuality had interfered
in her military service, and the conclusion of unfitness and ac-
companying stigma in the recommended discharge.' 8 Federal
District Court Judge Oliver J. Carter ordered Saal's discharge
stayed pending conclusion of judicial review of proceedings
against her. 9 Plaintiff's military contract was to expire on
January 5, 1975, and the Navy refused her application for ex-
tension because the pending litigation placed her on "legal
hold."20
On May 6, 1976, Saal filed an amended complaint seeking
partial summary judgment of her fifth amendment due pro-
cess claim. Plaintiff argued that the naval policy of homosex-
ual exclusion, based on SECNAVINST 1900.9A, was unconsti-
tutional on its face because it presumed every homosexual
unfit, and as applied to Saal the policy was unconstitutional
because section 1900.9A absolutely foreclosed her opportunity
to reenlist despite fitness for service.2 The court granted par-
tial summary judgment on February 8, 1977 to plaintiff-appel-
lee Saal, noting that the foreclosure of her chance to apply
and be considered for reenlistment in the Navy free from the
Navy's stigmatizing policy of excluding homosexuals deprived
Saal of liberty without due process of law.22 The court further
concluded that the absolute exclusionary regulations as ap-
plied to Saal were irrational and capricious.23
Defendant-appellant Secretary of the Navy appealed the
final judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. That court rendered its decision of October 23,
1980, in the form of three consolidated appeals: Saal v. Mid-
dendorf, Miller v. Rumsfeld, and Belier v. Middendorf.4 The
broad outlines of the three appeals were similar in that each
plaintiff admitted to engaging in homosexual acts in violation
18. Brief for Appellee, supra note 13, at 4, 5.
19. 427 F. Supp. at 194.
20. Brief for Appellee, supra note 13, at 5.
21. 427 F. Supp. at 194-95.
22. Id. at 202.
23. Id.
24. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
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of naval regulations.25 The court, in considering the constitu-
tionality of naval policy regarding homosexuals, reversed the
district court's holding and found that constitutional limits
were not exceeded, and therefore the regulation was valid.'
The court noted that although the policy may seem unwise,
"the political branches of the Government, which most cer-
tainly are on notice of the controversy here or in similar cases,
have the right and the prerogative to declare a different pol-
icy."'27 The court's reversal has since provided a forum for
stormy protest over this regressive stance on human rights.
III. MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING
A person charged with homosexual activity must appear
before an administrative discharge board, which gives its rec-
ommendation on the case to the Chief of Naval Personnel
where final authority rests." In Champagne v. Schlesinger,"
the Navy maintained that its regulations did not require dis-
charge of all homosexuals, rather it only required that homo-
sexuals be processed for discharge.8 0 The discharge board can
recommend retention, and where appropriate the Secretary
can retain a known homosexual." Regardless of this proce-
dure, "an individual with an otherwise fine service record will
not be retained unless the Secretary concludes his record
marks him as being highly unusual or especially valuable to
the Navy."'" As stated by the Secretary of the Navy:
[T]he decision of whether or not to discharge or retain a
serviceman involves a high degree of military discretion
and judgment. The decision is based on a balance that
only the military can strike, and the individuality of each
decision makes guidelines impossible. What must be
weighed is the need of the service for the specific attrib-
utes and talents that the particular serviceman possesses
and the effect on the military of the loss of the services of
that individual, against the actual or probable detriment
25. Id. at 792.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 427 F. Supp. at 200 (citing BuRAu o NAvAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
(BUPERSMAN) § 3420185-1-b).
29. 506 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1974).
30. Id. at 984.
31. 632 F.2d at 804.
32. Id. at 805.
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that retention of the individual would have upon the mili-
tary in general, and the effectiveness of the individual in
particular."
The Navy states that administrative processing of homo-
sexuals is mandatory because homosexuality "adversely im-
pacts" on the Navy in several particulars: tension is created
between those who despise homosexuals and those who are
homosexuals; performance of duties is influenced by emo-
tional relationships between homosexuals; disruptive physical
aggression exists between homosexuals and heterosexuals; and
fear of social stigma and criminal prosecution due to homo-
sexual activities is present.34 As the district court noted in
Saal," however, these factors could be grounds for excluding
others as well. For instance, minorities or women may be de-
spised; disruptive emotional relationships could develop be-
tween naval men and women, a reason previously cited by the
Navy justifying exclusion of women from its service; physical
aggression could and does exist among heterosexuals currently
in the Navy; and "fear of criminal prosecution, social stigma
and divorce and the danger of undue influence is a risk cre-
ated by any form of illegal or antisocial conduct, not confined
to homosexuality."3 6
Therefore, the Navy's rationale for mandatory adminis-
trative processing lacks uniqueness with regard to homosexual
personnel. It is simply a ritual for accomplishing the Navy's
ultimate goal of discharging homosexuals.
IV. PARALLELS: WOMEN AND HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY
The Navy enforced discriminatory racial and sexual poli-
cies as recently as a decade ago. On a comparative basis, inte-
gration of women "would undoubtedly parallel in many ways
the sweeping integration of blacks undertaken in 1948 ...
[Although the military warned] of decreased efficiency and
morale problems, . . . these fears proved largely unjusti-
fied."3" Current military policy indicates that personnel proce-
33. Id. at 804-05 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 811 n.22.
35. 427 F. Supp. at 192.
36. Id. at 201.
37. Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533,
1556 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Equal Rights].
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dures should be "essentially the same for men and women,
'except where there are legitimate rational reasons to do
otherwise.' "38
One indication of the disparate treatment of women is
embodied in section 6015 of the United States Code which
states:
[W]omen may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in
aircraft that are engaged in combat missions nor may
they be assigned to other than temporary duty on vessels
of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels
of a similar classification not expected to be assigned
combat missions.3
In one class action suit many women challenged the validity
of section 6015, claiming that it established a constitutionally
impermissible classification by barring women from service
upon combat vessels.40 In 1978, of the 25,000 enlisted women
in the Navy, not one was permitted to hold any position
aboard the Navy's fleet.4' The Navy had argued, in a fashion
similar to that of its argument in favor of mandatory homo-
sexual discharges, that any degree of integration of men and
women aboard ship could cause morale and discipline
problems among crews.
The results of a naval experiment, however, provide am-
ple evidence that assigning women to noncombat duty on ves-
sels poses no insurmountable problems.43 In 1972, the Navy
tested sexual integration aboard the U.S.S. Sanctuary, a hos-
pital ship. After thirteen months, "the commanding officer
reported that 'Women can perform every shipboard function
with equal ease, expertise, and dedication.' ",45 Women com-
prised twelve percent of the crew on the U.S.S. Sanctuary."
38. Id. at 1533 (quoting Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on the Utiliza-
tion of Manpower in the Military of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 92d
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 12439, 12451 n.2 (1972) (testimony of General Holm)).
39. 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970) (emphasis added to indicate changes as amended by
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-485, Tit. VIII, § 808, 92 Stat. 1623).
40. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).
41. Id. at 294.
42. Id. at 308-09.
43. Id. at 309.
44. San Francisco Examiner & Chronicle, Nov. 2, 1980 (This World), at 22, col.
3.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 23, col. 2.
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While living aboard ship, the women were commended for
working well and for creating fewer disciplinary problems
than the servicemen.4 On a twelve day voyage between Cali-
fornia and Columbia, however, relationships between the two
sexes developed which adversely affected the crew.48 To solve
the problem, the commanding officer made the questionable
behavior a punishable offense;4 9 in other words, punishment
was not meted out because personnel were heterosexual, but
because the couples had openly displayed affection.
Currently, women are excluded from combat duty in all
branches of the armed forces. In a 1977 Return of Forces to
Germany (REF-WAC) study, 200 women forming about ten
percent of the total personnel were scheduled to participate in
war games.50 One typical war game event
was the move of an advance party into an unsecured area.
Individuals, and teams, got a high rating if they stopped
their vehicles cautiously in concealed spots off the site,
promptly set up good perimeter security, and then moved
watchfully onto the site, looking for booby traps and
mines and keeping their voices down.51
After ten days, the conclusion was made that mixed-sex units
and all-male groups performed equally well, as did individual
men and women.52
In partially repealing section 6015, the Navy made availa-
ble to women the position of temporary duty on any vessel
not engaged in combat missions, and permanent duty on ves-
sels of a classification similar to hospital ships and trans-
ports. 3 While these changes may seem insignificant, they
open up career opportunities for women by giving them addi-
tional ratings and classifications currently precluded by the
statute. 4 Women have slowly made inroads on the issue of
gender-based discrimination as illustrated in a statement by




50. Id. at 24, col. 2.
51. Id., col. 3.
52. Id. "Contrary to the expectations of those who had doubted women's capac-
ity for endurance, women held up as well as men over the 10 days." Id.
53. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. at 298.
54. Id. at 298-99.
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1977: "Studies conducted by military authorities show not
only that women can 'capably perform' at sea, but also that
increasing the range of their assignments will enhance 'the op-
erational effectiveness and flexibility of available forces.' ,,
The Navy's attitude toward women in its ranks is similar
to its attitude toward homosexuals in its service, namely, that
their presence will have an adverse impact on effective mili-
tary performance. Women, however, have infiltrated and
changed naval policy while homosexuals are still perceived as
threats to morale and discipline, prevented from holding posi-
tions of security due to their sexual identification, and ren-
dered ineligible for service due to innate physical and emo-
tional characteristics.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES OF MILITARY DISMISSAL FOR
HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVITY
A. Protectable Liberty and Property Interests
In McConnell v. Anderson," the court reviewed a homo-
sexual's rejection from employment in the public sector and
noted:
An [sic] homosexual is after all a human being, and a citi-
zen of the United States despite the fact that he finds his
sex gratification in what most consider to be an uncon-
ventional manner. He is as much entitled to the protec-
tion and benefits of the laws and due process fair treat-
ment as are others, at least to public employment in the
absence of proof and not mere surmise that he has com-
mitted or will commit criminal acts or that his employ-
ment efficiency is impaired by his homosexuality."
In general, the federal government is considered progressive in
its employment of victims of discrimination, but it has made
few inroads in employing those "guilty of 'immorality.' ," The
courts have attempted to remedy this problem by requiring
that public agencies prove a tangible connection between im-
morality and the employee's ineffectiveness in carrying out
55. Id. at 307 (quoting Letter from W. Graham Claytor, Secretary of the Navy,
to the Speaker of the House (May 9, 1977) (defendant's answer to the pleadings, Saal
v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977)).
56. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970).
57. Id. at 814.
58. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-13, at 941 n.3 (1978).
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duties. Furthermore, the courts have particularly noted that
employment decisions based on private sexual conduct are
invidious."
In the celebrated case of Norton v. Macy,60 a National
Aeronautics and Space Administration employee was dis-
missed from his security position when he was discovered to
have engaged in occasional instances of homosexual conduct.
The Norton court noted that due process forbids all dismis-
sals which are arbitrary and capricious" and stated: "These
constitutional limits may be greater where, as here, the dis-
missal imposes a 'badge of infamy' disqualifying the victim
from any further Federal employment, damaging his pros-
pects for private employ, and fixing upon him the stigma of
an official defamation of character."" The concept of "badge
of infamy" and "stigma" forms the basis for the homosexual
individual's due process claim against the military. The Due
Process Clause does not apply to every government termina-
tion, but it does apply to terminations that deprive an indi-
vidual of a liberty or property interest.68
1. Deprivation of Liberty
In Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital," Judge
Sneed identified a protectable liberty interest as "the interest
an individual has in being free to move about, live and prac-
tice his profession without the burden of an unjustified label
of infamy."" When an individual is discharged from the mili-
tary for homosexuality, the label of infamy cannot be removed
by the characteristics of an honorable discharge, especially if
the discharge is involuntary. For example, Saal enjoyed and
intended to continue her naval career. Since her work per-
formance was outstanding as indicated by the letters of rec-
ommendation in her file, she expected to rise through the
ranks in her chosen field. Although her discharge from the
Navy was honorable, that designation cannot alleviate the
59. Id.
60. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 1164.
62. Id. (footnotes omitted).
63. Berg v. Claytor, 436 F. Supp. 76 (D.D.C. 1977) (citing Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
64. 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976).
65. Id. at 366 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S at 572).
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trauma associated with an involuntary discharge. The Navy's
"softening" of the blow of an involuntary discharge by classi-
fying it as "honorable," cannot remove the label of infamy
that Saal recognizes and must perhaps acknowledge in her
search for future government employment.
In the Saal-Miller-Belier appeal, the court stated that
Codd v. Velger" compelled the conclusion that plaintiff's lib-
erty interests were protected by the administrative hearing
conducted by the discharge board.' The court qualified its
definition of deprivation of liberty interests by contending
that if the Navy's charges of homosexuality "were false, made
public, and followed by discharge,. . . a deprivation of liberty
would occur." 68 The court, however, failed to consider the
stigmatizing effect on the discharged individual due to the
"Re-4" classification which becomes a permanent part of one's
service record.69 Future government employers cognizant of
the "Re-4" code and its inconsistency with an excellent ser-
vice performance record may require an explanation of this
anomaly. Thus, the label of infamy would continue to haunt
the homosexual individual by restricting employment oppor-
tunities particularly in the public sector.
2. Deprivation of Property
In discussing whether Naval discharge proceedings de-
prive the homosexual individual of a property interest, the
Saal court, citing Berg v. Claytor,'0 stated:
[U]nder Navy policy there can be no doubt that commit-
ting homosexual acts while in the Navy is cause for termi-
nation. Plaintiff has admitted to having performed homo-
sexual acts while in the Service. Having admitted there
was cause for dismissal, plaintiff's expectation of contin-
ued employment has been extinguished. Thus he had no
property interest. 1
For the homosexual serviceperson, the property interest in-
66. 429 U.S. 624 (1977). This was a four-member per curiam reversal of a hold-
ing that a policeman was deprived of procedural due process where allegations about
him were undisputed and a hearing had been denied.
67. 632 F.2d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 1980).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 436 F. Supp. at 81.
71. 632 F.2d at 805.
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fringed upon by the Navy's termination policy consists of a
"legitimate claim of entitlement ' 72 to extension of contract
opportunities and reenlistment where the individual's record
indicated a reasonable likelihood of extension. While naval of-
ficials discerned no property interest at stake, reasoning that
no serviceperson has a "right" to reenlistment, they ignored
the rule promulgated by Board of Regents v. Roth" which re-
quired that the expectation be based on rules or mutually ex-
plicit understandings. 7' If a serviceperson can demonstrate a
reasonable and legitimate expectation of renewed enlistment
based on naval requirements of quality performance, then
deprivation of such opportunity may violate a constitutional
property, as well as a liberty, interest.
B. Equal Protection of the Law
The equal protection guarantee embodied in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments is denied when the government clas-
sifies so as to distinguish, in its rules or policies, between per-
sons who should be regarded as similarly situated. 8 If the
classification is "suspect," or one that arbitrarily discriminates
against a particular group of persons on grounds including
race, religion, or national origin, then the court must examine
the classification with the "strictest scrutiny for some neces-
sary, compelling governmental interest. '76 On the other hand,
if the classification is not "suspect," then the court must ap-
ply the "rational basis" test, which requires a rational factor
to justify disparate treatment."
While the category of "minority sexual identification, ori-
entation, preference or expression certainly has not been held
'suspect,' "78 the argument in favor of homosexuals as a sus-
pect class can be made. The Navy's blanket policy requiring
dismissal of homosexual servicepersons is patently arbitrary.
It unjustifiably punishes, a large class of prospective, qualified,
72. 427 F. Supp. 192, 199 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
73. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
74. Id. at 577.
75. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, § 16-1, at 993.
76. Note, Schlesinger v. Ballard: Equal Protection Washes Out to Sea, 13 CAL.
W.L. REV. 317, 320 (1977).
77. Id.
78. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Crisis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1145 n.85 (1979).
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and competent employees 79 where an ad hoc determination of
fitness could adequately identify any persbnnel posing effi-
ciency or morale problems. The formulation and application
of military policy should be "constitutionally required to take
the form of individual decision-making since the ability of the
individual employee to cope with the needs of the job is de-
pendent upon ... individual abilities." 80 Strict scrutiny of
naval policies would entail their close analysis in order to
maintain the individual's right to equality and liberty; strict
scrutiny would include wariness of interests such as efficiency
and morale since these "can so easily and indiscriminately be
invoked, .... ,,81
If the court chooses to apply the "rational basis" test,
then the question becomes whether classifying homosexual
personnel differently from heterosexual personnel is rational,
and whether the classification bears a substantial relation to
the naval objectives of efficiency and morale. The Navy has
not demonstrated that homosexuals are unfit for service, and
therefore, its irrebuttable presumption that homosexuals can
never effectively meet the standards of performance necessary
for satisfactory service is irrational.
Furthermore, the Navy's policies and regulations fall vic-
tim to charges of both under and overinclusion.8' By defini-
tion, underinclusive classifications burden one group less than
is logical to achieve the intended government end;88 overinclu-
sive classifications operate to automatically enforce a rule
without regard for individual determinations." For example,
while naval regulations do not require mandatory discharge of
all who engage in disruptive conduct, they do require dis-
charge of every individual who admits to engaging in homo-
sexual activity without a determination of whether such activ-
ity impedes the accomplishment of the Navy's mission. s
The circuit court noted that the Navy regulations permit
79. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971).
80. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 290-91
(1975).
81. L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 1002.
82. 427 F. Supp. at 202 n.13.
83. L. TRIBE, supra note 58.
84. Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1123 (2d Cir. 1976).
85. 427 F. Supp. at 202 n.13.
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discharge by reason of misconduct for [flrequent involve-
ment of discreditable nature with civil and/or military au-
thorities; an established pattern for shirking; an estab-
lished pattern showing dishonorable failure to pay just
debts, and/or dishonorable failure to contribute support
to dependents, provided the member has been given a
reasonable opportunity to overcome his/her deficiencies
subsequent to official notification. . . . [T]he member
shall be notified of his/her deficiencies and shall be
counseled in regard thereto."6
According to the above regulation, certain offenses entitle the
serviceperson to overcome his/her problem and receive coun-
seling which in effect is the underinclusive aspect of naval pol-
icy.8 7 Overinclusiveness mandates that admitted homosexuals
will be discharged, albeit after an administrative hearing,
without regard for their fitness to continue serving in the
military.
One may argue that a "nexus" must be shown between
the person's homosexuality and the quality of military service,
rather than isolating one individual trait and determining that
except for this characteristic the individual would be fit for
military service.88 The Navy argues in rebuttal that it must
responsibly protect the fabric of military life, preserve the in-
tegrity of the recruiting process, maintain personnel disci-
pline, and insure the acceptance of men and women in the
military.8 9
In a recent retreat from its own overinclusive policies, the
United States Army retracted its statements that homosexual
persons are a security risk, and revised its policy to state that
engaging in homosexual acts is not of itself sufficient reason to
deny security clearance.9 0 Those who charged that homosexu-
ality exposes one to blackmail, which jeopardizes the confi-
dentiality of certain communications, have received a setback
by the Army's modification of its former position that homo-
sexuality demonstrates unreliability, untrustworthiness, and
86. 632 F.2d at 803 n.10 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 803. The only other categories that provide for mandatory discharge
proceedings are various sexual offenses and the sale of or trafficking in drugs.
88. Doe v. Chaffee, 355 F. Supp. 112, 114 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
89. 632 F.2d at 811.
90. Preston v. Secretary of the Army, San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 14, 1980, at
6, col. 3 (out-of-court settlement).
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unsuitability.9 1 As stated by the district court in Saa 1;12
[Tihe problems which the Navy enumerates to support
blanket exclusion of persons who engage in homosexual
acts are problems which are endemic to a heterogeneous
society such as the navy and with which it deals in the
ordinary course of its operations on a case by case basis.
Defendant does not, and presumably could not, contend
that blanket exclusion of persons who have engaged in
homosexual acts would eliminate or substantially reduce
these problems. Yet those persons alone are classified as
'intolerable' and singled out for 'prompt separation.'93
Until the courts determine that homosexuals may be consid-
ered a "suspect" class, or that they engage in constitutionally
protected behavior, homosexuals remain subject to invidious
classification by the Navy.
C. The Right to Privacy
Intricately related to the equal protection analysis is the
issue of whether the challenged rules "effectively deny the
right to privacy by 'imposing a burden on' or 'significantly in-
terfer[ing] with' the decision in question. '94 Clearly, a consti-
tutional right to privacy does not encompass the interest in
sexual privacy, but rather embodies the freedom to decide
one's sexual orientation." Although each person has a federal
constitutional right to privacy, described as the "right of the
individual to be let alone,"96 the right to engage in consensual
private homosexual behavior is proscribed in many states. For
instance, the United States Supreme Court has issued a sum-
mary affirmance of a lower court decision which denied a chal-
lenge to a state statute prohibiting sodomy in regard to pri-
vate consensual homosexual conduct.97 Four years after the
decision, however, the New York Supreme Court ruled in Peo-
ple v. Onofre9" that the sodomy statute was unconstitutional
91. Id.
92. 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
93. Id. at 201-02 (footnotes omitted).
94. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1051 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
95. Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d at 1125.
96. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
97. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g
without opinion 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
98. 72 A.D.2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Div. 1980).
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as applied to homosexual conduct. The court also ruled in
benShalom v. Secretary of Army,99 that sexual personality
and preference, as opposed to conduct, is protected by a con-
stitutional right to privacy.
Judge Merhige, in Lovisi v. Slayton,100 characterized the
constitutional right to privacy not as behavior within the con-
fines of marriage vows for sexual activity, but as something
intensely private to the person that compels constitutional
protection.' 0 ' In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Rich-
mond, Judge Merhige noted further that the right to privacy
includes "intimate personal decisions or private matters of
substantial importance to the well-being of. . .individuals,"
including concensual adult sexual relationships "whether het-
erosexual or homosexual.' In contrast, the Navy's position
is that homosexual acts are not a constitutionally protected
activity and most federal courts agree that homosexual con-
duct does not receive special constitutional protection under
the due process clause.' 03
The Saal court acknowledged that there may be a right
to engage in homosexual conduct "in at least some circum-
stances.' 0 4 The court, however, while noting that the Navy's
blanket rule regarding homosexuals "is perhaps broader than
necessary to accomplish . . . its goals," concluded that the im-
portance of government interests outweighs the privacy inter-
ests of homosexual servicepersons.' e5 One point deserving em-
phasis in the court's analysis of the privacy issue is "the
relative impracticality at this time of achieving the Govern-
ment's goals by regulations which turn more precisely on the
facts of an individual case. .... 011 This viewpoint opens the
door to a more flexible, individualized approach in dealing
with homosexuality if the Navy further revises its policy.
Cases such as benShalom, aid the homosexual serviceperson's
cause by acknowledging that sexual preference is within the
99. 489 F. Supp. 964, 976 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
100. 363 F. Supp. 620, 625 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349
(4th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
101. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281, 1321 (1977).
102. 403 F. Supp. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
103. 632 F.2d at 809-10.
104. Id. at 810.
105. Id. at 812.
106. Id. at 810 (emphasis added).
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ambit of one's constitutional right to privacy.
Since the Navy punishes homosexual orientation rather
than the conduct itself, the Navy violates the homosexual's
right to privacy. As an extension of the equal protection argu-
ment, the Navy is also guilty of selectivity; it does not bar
persons from the service who profess a heterosexual orienta-
tion. If the Navy instituted a policy which would exact penal-
ties for openly affectionate homosexual conduct as it does for
heterosexual conduct, then not only would the serviceperson's
right to privacy be preserved, but the Navy could refute
claims of selective enforcement while maintaining discipline.
VI. MODIFICATION OF THE AUTOMATIC DISMISSAL POLICY: AN
IMPOSSIBLE GUIDELINE
Since the inception of the Saal-Miller-Beller appeal, the
Navy has issued a new regulation, SECNAVINST 1900.9C,
governing the discharge of homosexual servicepersons. The
policy provides for limited retention of homosexuals as illus-
trated by the pertinent language in SECNAVINST 1900.9C:
"A member who has solicited, attempted, or engaged in a ho-
mosexual act on a single occasion and who does not profess or
demonstrate proclivity to repeat such an act may be consid-
ered for retention in the light of all relevant circum-
stances. 10 7 The criteria for retention refers to homosexual ac-
tivity on a single occasion only. The Webster definition of
homosexual, however, is "[o]ne whose sexual inclination is to-
wards those of the individual's own sex rather than the oppo-
site sex."108 In other words, one must evidence a proclivity to-
wards homosexuality in order to be considered homosexual.
Thus, SECNAVINST 1900.9C does not, in reality, provide for
limited retention of homosexuals because the conditions
placed upon the homosexual serviceperson require him/her to
attest to only one homosexual incident and promise never to
do so again. The Navy assumes that homosexuality is an acci-
dent, or a temporary condition, and forces the person to deny
his/her sexual orientation in order to remain in the service.
In effect, the new regulation is a cosmetic measure
107. Id. at 802 n.9 (emphasis added).
108. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 290, 559 P.2d
1340, 1344 (1977) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED
(2d ed.)).
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designed to appease the opponents of SECNAVINST
1900.9A, while reinforcing the Navy's generally inflexible
stance on discharging homosexuals from its ranks. The Nor-
ton decision considered statistics from a Kinsey study which
indicated that at least 37 percent of the total American male
population had engaged in homosexual activity at least
once,10 9 and no evidence revealed that those within the 37 per-
cent group were disloyal, inefficient, or security risks. But
SECNAVINST 1900.9C states, without any statistical proof,
that "[t]he presence of such a member in a military environ-
ment seriously impairs combat readiness, efficiency, security
and morale." 110
Curiously, the Secretary of the Navy has stated that "the
individuality of each decison [to discharge or retain a
serviceperson] makes guidelines impossible.""' Yet,
SECNAVINST 1900.9C is a guideline formulated, not in
favor of ad hoc analysis, but on the basis of a rigid, uniform
standard. If the individual does not fit into the regulation's
narrowly defined categories, then the person must be relieved
of future military service regardless of fitness. What the Saal
court characterized as a "narrower regulation '"1 is nothing
more than a revised wording of the arbitrary directive barring
military homosexuality.
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
While the Navy attempted to pacify the challengers of
the automatic dismissal policy with the adoption of
SECNAVINST 1900.9C, clearly the new regulation is inade-
quate. It neither addresses the constitutional arguments nor
109. 417 F.2d at 1167-68 n.28.
The most widely accepted study of American sexual practices estimates
that 'at least 37 per cent' of the American male population have at least
one homosexual experience during their lifetime. Kinsey, Pomeroy &
Martin, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623 (1948). If this is so, a
policy of excluding all persons who have engaged in homosexual conduct
from government employ would disqualify for public service over one-
third of the male population. This result would be both inherently ab-
surd and devastating to the public service .. . .But we must assume
that the Government carries many such potentially embarrassing em-
ployees on its roles without noticeable impact on the efficiency of the
service.
110. 632 F.2d at 802 n.9.
111. Id. at 804.
112. Id. at 812.
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provides workable guidelines for determining the fitness of
homosexual personnel in the Navy. In light of the dis-
crepencies of SECNAVINST 1900.9C, this comment proposes
two solutions for the evaluation of homosexual naval
personnel.
One suggested resolution would require discharges to be
based on unfitness rather than on sexual preference. If a ho-
mosexual individual was demonstrably unfit to serve in the
military and if "unfitness" were defined as inability to per-
form assigned functions and duties, then cause for dismissal
would be reasonably related to standards of fitness for service.
As an adjunct to the discharge process, full hearings would be
required to prove fitness or disprove unfitness. Instead of ap-
proaching the issue of homosexuality on a "strict liability" ba-
sis, whereby one's admission requires naval disqualification,
the individual could rebut the presumption of unfitness by
presenting evidence favorable to his/her retention in the ser-
vice. The Navy currently offers the homosexual individual no
such opportunity; instead, one's homosexual preference auto-
matically bars further military service. The absolute and
mandatory nature of naval policy "deprives service members
of procedural due process by foreclosing their individual op-
portunities to clear their names, show their fitness, disprove
their unfitness, and remain in the service."11
Another suggestion for the successful integration of
homosexuals into the military would include studies per-
formed by military authorities to determine the effects of ho-
mosexuality on naval morale and efficiency. Even though the
Navy has had the opportunity to retain known homosexuals
in its ranks, in no instance has it done so; thus the Navy has
no basis for its current claims that such sexual orientation
would be disruptive. As illustrated by the Navy's integration
of blacks and women into the service, the process was ardu-
ous, but resulted in the Navy's concession that both groups
can perform functions vital to the service. If the Navy can rec-
ognize that a woman must be judged individually on her abili-
ties to serve, then it must provide the same opportunity for
the homosexual person to demonstrate fitness.
113. Brief for Appellee, supra note 13, at 36.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Discharges of homosexuals as military liabilities and se-
curity risks from the armed forces, and particularly the Navy,
present the problem of balancing government interests against
an individual's right to freely choose a sexual preference. The
absolutist view of SECNAVINST 1900.9C, while couched in
more liberal terms than SECNAVINST 1900.9A, appears to
deprive persons of procedural due process by rejecting indi-
vidual attempts to prove fitness for the military life despite
sexual orientation.
Judicial deference to military regulations has allowed few
victories by proponents of human rights. Application of arbi-
trary naval policies imposes a label of infamy upon the dis-
charged person's military record, renders one permanently in-
eligible for reenlistment, and arguably deprives a person of
protected liberty and property interests.
Previous government claims that women's physical attrib-
utes precluded them from service since men could develop
speed, strength, and endurance more effectively have been
disproven in case studies by military authorities. Yet, even
though homosexuals have proven their ability to serve, illus-
trated by effective performance of their duties prior to the
Navy's discovery of their sexual identification, the Navy's
blanket exclusionary policy requires mandatory discharge re-
gardless of such fitness. The Navy's paternalistic attitude to-
ward women has gradually dissipated, primarily because the
Navy recognized its duty to provide "a test program, estab-
lished as part of the Navy goal of equal rights and opportuni-
ties for women. 11 4 It seems equally as important for the Navy
to provide a similar opportunity for assimilation of homosexu-
als into its service, and to acknowledge that a tremendous
source of labor remains untapped due to the Navy's policies.
Provision for a standard of reasonableness by which to
balance military exigencies with due process considerations
would prevent arbitrary and capricious actions based solely on
a person's sexual orientation. If it can be shown that homo-
sexuality has a deleterious effect on one's ability to perform a
job, then adverse action taken against the individual may be
justified. If, however, a rational relationship between homo-
114. Note, Equal Rights, supra note 37, at 1542 n.54 (quoting N.Y. Times, Jan.
11, 1973, at 77, col. 1).
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sexuality and job performance cannot be demonstrated, then
the conclusion that one is unfit to continue employment is un-
tenable, despite the Navy's current use of such reasoning to
terminate those who have homosexual tendencies.
The Navy's encroachment upon individual rights in its ef-
fort to maintain discipline in the military should be tempered
by the realization that "the notion that it could be an appro-
priate function of the federal bureaucracy to enforce the ma-
jority's conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of
its employees is at war with elementary concepts of liberty,
privacy, and diversity." '115
Theresa J. Canepa
115. 417 F.2d at 1165.

